Agency Costs, Ownership, And Internal Governance Mechanisms: Evidence From Chinese Listed Companies

dc.contributor.author	Vijayakumaran, R.
dc.date.accessioned	2019-02-01T05:39:08Z
dc.date.accessioned	2022-06-28T03:52:11Z
dc.date.available	2019-02-01T05:39:08Z
dc.date.available	2022-06-28T03:52:11Z
dc.date.issued	2019-01-02
dc.identifier.issn	2222-6737
dc.identifier.uri	http://repo.lib.jfn.ac.lk/ujrr/handle/123456789/1233
dc.description.abstract	In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance in China. This paper examines the impact of internal governance mechanisms such as ownership structure and board characteristics and debt financing on agency costs making use of a large panel of Chinese listed firms. We find that managerial ownership and debt financing work as effective corporate governance mechanisms for Chinese listed firms to mitigate agency conflicts and the resultant agency costs.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	Asian Economic and Financial Review	en_US
dc.subject	Agency costs	en_US
dc.subject	Ownership structure	en_US
dc.subject	Board structure	en_US
dc.subject	Debt financing	en_US
dc.title	Agency Costs, Ownership, And Internal Governance Mechanisms: Evidence From Chinese Listed Companies	en_US
dc.type	Other	en_US