

'EMPIRICAL' BUDDHISM AND PHILOSOPHY

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1. Introduction

1.1 An attempt seems to have been made in the Buddhist world to interpret Early Buddhist Philosophy on an empirical footing associating the Humean type of Empiricism in the English-speaking world. A pioneer work in this field is Dr. K. N. Jayatilleke's *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*.¹ In it he says "We find at the same time that many of the doctrines of Buddhism are claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of extrasensory perception. In this respect extrasensory perception is treated at the same level as normal perception and it is considered possible to make both valid and erroneous inferences on this data".² Alternatively it looks as if the main point seems to be the question of the epistemological standing of extrasensory perception. This paper deals directly with this question.

1.2 Karma and Rebirth are two significant concepts in the Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. According to Jayatilleke, Karma is one of the prominent doctrines derived as an inductive inference on the basis of the data of extrasensory perception.³ The concept of rebirth too is explained by him in a similar way. For instance, Jayatilleke says that "The Buddhist Theory of Survival has its origin in the Enlightenment of the Buddha and not in any traditional Indian belief. It is said that it was on the night of his Enlightenment that he acquired the capacity to know his prior lives".⁴ Now hypothetically assuming the claimed inductive basis of the significant concepts such as Karma and Rebirth in early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, we wish to examine the credibility of this thesis.

2. The Problem

2.1 To start with, what are inductive inferences? An inductive inference is a generalization from observed concomitance. This idea can be made clear in the following way. For instance, inductive reasoning is taken to cover all the cases in which we pass either from a particular statement of fact or from a set of particular statements of fact, to a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail. Therefore the inference may be to proceed directly by analogy from a particular instance to another, or from a series of particular instances to a general law. However, in this kind of inductive reasoning there is one significant assumption we make, namely, the acceptance of an important measure of the uniformity in nature. The marked feature of this line of argumentation is the avoidance of an inconsistency between the factual premise and the factual conclusion which does not formally entail. But if inductive inference exhibits the above features, can one find them in the so-called inductive inference that Jayatilleke claims to have found as regards many of the doctrines of Buddhism? To put the issue yet more generally, can there be inductive inferences based on the data of extrasensory perception? The issue is a somewhat larger one to which we should now turn.

Jayatilleke does not attempt to define 'extrasensory perception'; but contends by saying that "...many of the doctrines of Buddhism are claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of extrasensory perception....." etc. But he says at some other place, "...some of these experiences such as ante-natal retrocognition have been claimed by people under deep hypnosis. For others such as telepathy and clairvoyance, it is believed that there is a certain amount of experimental data which tends to confirm the existence of such faculties. We have reason therefore to believe that genuine claims were made about having these experiences. The other question is whether these experiences were veridical or delusive. This falls outside the scope of our study and we do not propose to examine it here".⁴ To some extent, these assertions indicate that Jayatilleke seems to have misconceived the role of a theory of knowledge.

2.2 Epistemologically speaking, there seems to be an attempt to evade the issue and to refuse to accept the gravity of the significant theoretical problem which crops up here. The question as to the veridicality or delusoriness of these experiences is vital to his interpretation of Buddhist theory of knowledge as the emphasis is empirical. Two things follow. Firstly, the ambiguity of the scope of this monolithic theory of knowledge; and secondly that this theory is nothing but a hotch-potch of both empirical and non-empirical concepts belonging to two different contexts. It deals with empirical and non-empirical concepts: but purports to determine their epistemological status through empiricism. Such

a theory has the effect of an oscillation between the empirical and non-empirical environments and this only makes the problem as to the veridicality or the delusoriness of these experiences recede into the background. Apparently, Jayatilleke does not see this significant point, and believes that this problem falls outside the scope of a possible Buddhist theory of knowledge. But this belief is false.

3. Concepts such as veridicality, delusoriness and experience

3.1 From a glance at the general map of perceptual concepts, it will be seen that the concept of 'experience' occupies the most vital position. And, empirically speaking 'experience' forms the very basis of our perceptions. But what is perception? In contemporary philosophy of the English-speaking world, 'perception' is understood in multifarious ways. According to D. M. Armstrong, "Perception is a flow of information, a flow that goes on the whole time that we are not completely unconscious".⁷ Elsewhere he adds that "...perception is nothing but the acquiring of true or false beliefs concerning the current state of the organism's body and environment".⁸ As R. J. Hirst interprets it, "...perceiving is a relation between person and public object in which a mode of active experience, perceptual consciousness, is caused in him by the stimulation of his sense organs by the object or by emanation from it".⁹ D. W. Hamlyn holds that "...in the primary sense 'perception' can signify any means whereby we come to recognize, identify or characterize something by means of the sense".¹⁰ According to these views, 'perception' has something proximate to do with the human bio-chemical system and the environmental world around. Conceptually speaking, 'sense experience', 'perception', 'identification', 'environmental world', 'bio-chemical system' seem to be the significant concepts in this conceptual system.

3.2 Basically deviating from the scope of recent perceptual philosophy as envisaged in the English-speaking world, Jayatilleke's English work attempts to widen the scope by inclusion of an alleged new species of experience called 'extrasensory experience' or 'extrasensory perception',¹¹ the material for this widening is claimed by him to be found in the Pali Nikāyas. Is this novel inclusion theoretically permissible in a theory of knowledge which is at the same time claimed to be empirical? Are the so-called 'extrasensory perceptions' perceptions at all, and, if so, are they veridical or delusory?

3.3 Let me start with the second question. What sort of an answer does Jayatilleke supply in this connection? It will not do to say that he is of the opinion that "...this falls outside the scope of our study and we do not propose to examine it here".¹² This would be a proposal to close the most controversial study, logically appropriate to his proposed empiricism-based Buddhist theory of knowledge.

On the other hand this way of putting the case makes it theoretically impossible for us to examine as to whether many of the doctrines of Buddhism are inductive inferences or not. To put the case more explicitly, the veridicality or the delusoriness of 'extrasensory perception' needs careful examination, and is precisely what needs to be established mostly in a theory of knowledge. The following assertion of Ayer perhaps illustrates the logical reasoning underlying this need: ".....that there cannot be a mental state which, being as it were directed towards a fact, is such that it guarantees the fact is so. And here I am not saying merely that such states never do occur or even that it is causally impossible that they ever should occur, but rather that it is logically impossible. My point is that from the fact that someone is convinced that something is true, however firm his conviction may be, it never follows logically that it is true".¹³ It seems to follow from this that the claims in the Jayatilleke-interpretation remain unestablished on the one hand, and appear arbitrary on the other.

That Jayatilleke's claims are arbitrary is also seen from his own following statement: "It may be asked whether the claims to extrasensory perception belong to the mythical and miraculous elements in the Canon and whether these claims were actually made by the Buddha and his disciples. There is reason to believe that these claims were actually made. There is no doubt that Yoga-practices prevailed among the thinkers of the Middle and Late Upanisads, the Jains, some of the Ajivakas and the Buddhists. Claims of this kind were common to all these schools".¹⁴ But this is no more than an impressive display of historical and mythical data. It does not establish the claims in question. To put it a little more explicitly, this display does not even specify the veridicality of the claims, let alone their establishment.

3.4 A theory of knowledge, perhaps, generally speaking, tries to account for all perceptions by distinguishing between perceptually true and perceptually false statements. But it seems the case that Jayatilleke closes the inquiry by merely stating the claims only. But to make a claim does not exhaust all what we have to say about a possible Buddhist theory of knowledge or any theory of knowledge. In fact Jayatilleke, the claimed empirico-epistemologist, should have done the following:

- (i) A careful examination of the said claims in the Canon to limit his 'language-game' together with an understanding of the group or family of concepts and
- (ii) A genuine attempt to establish the veridicality of the said claims.

In fact he avoids both (i) and (ii) above. The implication is far too much than what Jayatilleke believed. In this paper an attempt is made to work out this implication.

As previously stated, Jayatilleke seems to equate normal perceptions and extrasensory perceptions without making a logical investigation to unearth their logical nature. An implication which follows from this unsupported claim is the logical limitation of the scope of his theory to the category of veridical perception alone. To put the case a little more explicitly, extrasensory perception, according to him, is not different from veridical (normal) perception, epistemologically; for extrasensory perceptions are but perceptually true ones. On the other hand on no grounds he could accept 'delusions', 'hallucinations', 'illusions' and 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions' as all perceptions are accepted to be veridical perceptions or perceptually true ones. His treatment of extrasensory perceptions and normal perceptions as if they are veridical, would evidently suggest it.

Alternatively, it is seen that this thesis accepts an extremely limited concept of perception though a seeming attempt is made to widen the scope of Jayatilleke's perceptual philosophy by an inclusion of alleged extrasensory perception. This enlargement makes Jayatilleke's task still more difficult as he is left with only one category, namely, 'veridical perception' to account for all perception. For, as mentioned above, a theory of knowledge tries to account for all perceptions by distinguishing between perceptually true and perceptually false statements. To be plain, the scope of his study is unlimited whereas the only category in terms of which he tries to give content and body to it is 'veridical perception'.

3.5 To limit 'perceptions' to the category of 'veridical perception' alone is the most primitive logical principle in Jayatilleke's interpretation. But in essence it is a logically unsound principle which makes this version mythical. This I hope to show in what follows.

3.5.1 At the outset, however, it must be emphasized that the term 'perception' is ambiguously employed by Jayatilleke. For instance, it is used without much proviso added to refer to both 'perception' on the one hand and what he purports to refer to by 'extrasensory perception' on the other. Same is the case with 'experience'. This amounts to the misusing of the terms 'perception' and 'experience'. The point will be highlighted once the argument in this paper is established.

3.5.2 At this juncture, it is to the point to emphasize the basic need to account for other perceptions such as illusions, hallucinations, delusion and veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions in a theory of knowledge. For a theory of knowledge tries to account for all perceptions by distinguishing between perceptually true and perceptually false statements. Jayatilleke looks as if he comes very near to the starting point of the examination. That he makes an effort is evident from the assertion he makes to the effect that "The other question

is whether these experiences (extrasensory experiences) were veridical or delusive".¹⁵ However we saw above how he closed the discussion by saying that the study falls outside his scope.

3.5.3 Yet we wish to continue from where Jayatilleke concluded, namely, 'delusory perception', to show the theoretical defect of the assertion as far as the epistemological endeavour is concerned. And at the outset we wish to emphasize the meaningfulness and the existence of perceptions very different from both normal veridical perceptions and delusion (delusory perception) he initially hinted at, and, we also attempt to exhibit the philosophical significance of at least one of these perceptions in the context of Early Buddhist theory of knowledge. And at the end, we believe that this category of perception and its very logical nature will undercut the main crux of Jayatilleke's argument which incorporates 'extrasensory perceptions' and the concept of inductive inference. We wish to develop our thesis through certain concepts of non-veridical perception envisaged in the English-speaking world. Let me begin with a point appropriately raised by the British philosopher J. L. Austin in his 'Sense And Sensibilia'.

4. J. L. Austin and 'delusion'

4.1 Austin critically analysing A. J. Ayer's formulation of 'the Argument from Illusion' says that there are two clear implications of the latter's argument. They are "(a) that all the cases cited in the argument are cases of illusion: and (b) that illusion and delusion are the same thing"¹⁶ But what is this so-called 'Argument from Illusion'? According to Ayer, it runs as follows: "This argument, as it is ordinarily stated is based on the fact that material things may present different appearances to different observers or to the same observer in different conditions, and that the character of these appearances is to some extent causally determined by the state of the conditions and the observer"¹⁷ As examples Ayer cites mirror-images, refractions, hallucinations, double visions, apparent variations in taste, etc. and categorises all of these as illusions. Quite correctly, Austin points out Ayer's error in confusing illusion, delusion, and hallucination. So he adds "..... 'an illusion' (in a perceptual context) does not suggest that something totally unreal is conjured up; whereas the term 'delusion' does suggest something totally unreal, not really there at all"¹⁸

4.2 What is demonstrated by these examples is that there are some data (by necessity extra-linguistic) to be noticed. And these contents make the phenomenon of illusion very different from objective hallucinations on the one hand and delusions on the other. Therefore all non-veridical perceptions are not delusions (delusory perceptions).

4.3 In this context it is more than apparent that Jayatilleke's categorization of perception seems ambiguous, inadequate and misleading; for he arbitrarily limits the scope of perception to veridical perception. But in fact the case is that there is, at least, one category of perception which does not belong to either of the two. In short the theory of knowledge under review does not account for all perceptions as it fails to see the meaningfulness of non-veridical perceptions such as,

- (i) illusory perception
- (ii) hallucinatory perception and
- (iii) 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perception'.

Alternatively, one of them or all of them cannot be subsumed under the concept in the Jayatilleke-interpretation since the latter denotes, strictly speaking, the results of mental disorder, fever, starvation etc.

4.4 Broadly speaking, non-veridical perception is of four sub-categories (each basically different from one another) namely, delusion, illusion, hallucination and 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perception'. Only the first type of perception is mentioned in the Jayatilleke interpretation, let alone their proper accounting. The other three categories of non-veridical perception are left out.

5. The Concepts of hallucination and illusion

5.1 An objective hallucination can be defined in terms of a perception reported in the presence of certain stimulations of the sense organs: they include mirages in noontide heat at the farthest ends of straight roads, across extensive fields, etc. In an objective hallucination such as "seeing a mirage" in noontide heat, a host of other environmental conditions are responsible for its generation, besides those of the percipient. Such objective hallucinations are projected by outer atmospheric conditions: furthermore, they are accessible to public perceptual experience as physical objects such as chairs, omnibuses, etc. are but with a difference. For there is no water really there, viz., at the farthest ends of straight roads, across extensive fields, across farm country, etc., at noontide heat.

But are they different from delusions (delusory perception)? We may cite as illustrative examples of delusions, the following: delusions of grandeur, delusions of persecution, etc. With reference to this phenomenon, Austin says, "An illusion (in a perceptual context) does not suggest that something totally unreal is conjured up... whereas the term 'delusion' does suggest something totally unreal, not really there at all".¹⁹ Elsewhere he adds "delusions are a much more serious matter—something is really wrong, and what's more, wrong with the person who has them. He needs to be cured".²⁰ In short, granted an absence of sensory contacts and artificial phenomena such as

toxins, drugs, suggestion, etc., delusions are the results of mental disorder, fever, starvation, extreme thirst, acute anxiety, delirium tremens, etc. On this basis the person has to be cured. R. J. Hirst the English-speaking perceptual philosopher appreciably strengthens this view when he says, "Thus owing to drunkenness, fever, privation, emotional disturbance or even perhaps drowsiness, the person confuses such imagery with perceived objects."²¹ Consequently, the statements made by such people are not true. Such statements endorse nothing as regards the world around us. Nor do they imply a special super-human ability in the subject. They are simply delusions because the subject sees nothing as there is nothing to be seen. If so, in the case of 'delusion' there cannot be any knowledge in the sense of knowledge that such and such is the case.

5.2 However, when one sees hallucinations expressed in the form of "seeing mirages in noontide heat at farthest ends of straight roads", etc., the mirages in question are objective and public as well. If so, does one see something in these particular hallucinations? In this connection, J. R. Smythies says, "...in actual English usage, the words such as 'see', 'look', 'hear', etc., are used to describe hallucinatory sense-experiences as well as veridical ones".²²

5.2.1 In one sense, they can be used "...in such a way that to say of an object that it is perceived does not entail saying that it exists in any sense at all".²³ And it "is also a correct and familiar usage of the word 'perceive' in which to say of an object that it is perceived does carry the implication that it exists".²⁴

5.2.2 Furthermore, Armstrong's concepts such as 'existence-grammar' and 'success-grammar' strengthen the point in question. For instance, phrases of the form 'sees an X' or 'perceives a cat', etc., have 'existence-grammar', but do not imply a cognitive success. However, 'seeing that', 'perceive that...', etc., do endorse and do imply a cognitive success (discovery of physicality). Hence these phrases have 'success-grammar'. The former expression can very well endorse an hallucination whereas in the latter, such hallucinations are analytically ruled out. This division appreciably strengthens the correct usages of the perceptual verbs such as 'see', 'perceive', etc. And in turn it inevitably strengthens the logical position of objective hallucinations, in the context of perception. Accordingly, there is sense in one's claims that one sees a mirage in noontide heat at the farthest end of straight roads or across extensive fields, etc. Further this claim is neither a delusion in Austin's sense of this word nor an acquiring of a false belief as Armstrong uses the word 'hallucination'.

5.3 Similarly, it is neither a veridical perception nor a delusion as Jayatilleke entertains these terms. What is thus shown in th

paper is that there is a separate category of perceptions called 'hallucinations' which is such that it differs both from veridical perceptions and delusory perceptions. Thus, this distinction substantially undermines the Jayatilleke interpretation which accepts only veridical and delusory perceptions.

For "experiences such as ante-natal retrocognition" seem neither veridical perceptions nor delusory perceptions nor objective hallucinations nor illusions. However, Jayatilleke takes for granted that they are veridical, though he evades substantiating his standpoint. If so, we cannot expect inductive generalizations from these unsubstantiated and seemingly mythical premises. To put it a little more explicitly, a particular statement of fact or a set of particular statements of fact is non-existent; hence a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail, does not follow.

5.4 To sum up the argument so far, we have attempted to elicit the meaningfulness and existence of certain types of non-veridical perceptions other than the delusions (delusory perceptions) hinted at but not developed by Jayatilleke. I conclude, therefore that it is not out of the question that the following sub-categories of non-veridical perceptions directly affect the very basis of his empirical theory of knowledge. They are as follows:

- (i) illusory perceptions,
- (ii) hallucinatory perceptions
and
- (iii) "veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions" (basically) different from (ii) above.

And as there was no indication or limit, let alone a logical analysis of 'extrasensory perception', we shall have to accommodate statements involving these perceptions within the wider category of Veridical perception. But are they veridical perceptions at all?

6. "Extrasensory perception"

6.1 Although Jayatilleke assumes that the 'extrasensory perception' such as retrocognition, telepathy, clairvoyance, etc., must be always assigned the truth-value 'true'²⁵, we cannot accept it without critical examination. We tentatively suggest that they are neither veridical perceptions nor delusory perceptions. Furthermore, the discussion hitherto shows that there are several perceptions other than the veridical and delusory ones expounded by Jayatilleke. Now we shall attempt a logical analysis of the concept of 'extrasensory perception'.

6.1.2 C. D. Broad coined the technical phrase 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perception' to denominate 'extrasensory perception'. He describes them in this way: "We shall say that a person was having

such an experience on a given occasion, if and only if the following two conditions were fulfilled: (i) He was ostensibly seeing, hearing, touching or otherwise sensibly perceiving a certain person or event or state of affairs as external to his body. Whilst (ii) at that time his eyes, ears, fingers or other receptor sense organs were not being affected in the normal physical manner...²⁶ These are cases of 'automatic seeing', 'automatic hearing', etc. But sensation, electrical transmission of impulses to the brain, the environmental forces such as radiant energy in the form of light, pressure waves, etc. which are the sufficient, necessary and constant causes of the occurrence called veridical perception in the sense of a 'successful occurrence' (or as D. M. Armstrong puts across, 'success-grammar' of the case), are non-present in the above mentioned cases. Therefore, the information allegedly supplied by retrocognition, telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, etc., are not supplied by any means known to us.

6.2 'Extrasensory perception' understood in this way looks as if it contradicts the laws of physics. However, by definition, if 'extrasensory perception' is limited to telepathy alone, one can probably get around this objection by some sophisticated radiation theory as noted by Arthur Koestler. But telepathy is not the most puzzling of these phenomena. For Koestler adds "A number of researchers, starting with Rhine himself, were reluctantly made to realise that some of their star subjects produced results showing more or less the same odds against chance if the target cards to be guessed had not been previously seen by the agent. Apparently, they did not 'read' the agents thoughts; they seemed to read directly the symbols printed on the cards... This phenomenon was labelled 'clairvoyance' and defined as 'extrasensory perception of objective events as distinguished from telepathic perception of the mental state of another person'. Some form of 'mental radio' had always been intuitively acceptable to open-minded persons, trusting that science would sooner or later discover how it worked; the perception-at-a-distance of inanimate objects was much harder to swallow, even with an unprejudiced palate. Gilbert Murray rejected the possibility of clairvoyance".²⁷

6.3 At this juncture, it is very clear that 'extrasensory perception' gets divided into two basically different categories, namely, telepathy on the one hand and other 'extrasensory perceptions' such as clairvoyance, clairaudience, retrocognition, psychokinesis, etc., on the other. The former may avoid it being contradicted by these laws of physics. On this basis the undifferentiated single category of 'extrasensory perceptions' in Jayatilleke's interpretation gets into a significant theoretical difficulty. For it gets contradicted by the laws of physics. The dubiousness of its empirical nature is thus markedly evident too.

6.4 In this context, a concept like "on the data of extrasensory perception"²⁸ which is very much in vogue amongst Buddhist empirical

epistemologists such as Jayatilleke seems devoid of meaning; for the attempt in Jayatilleke's empirical theory of knowledge is to give application to a concept without reference to the other concepts that form its normal background. This is what Wittgenstein calls 'an engine idling'.²⁹ The British philosopher D. W. Hamlyn says that "In such cases the use of the concept is empty",³⁰ as the background for the appropriate application of the concept is simply missing. Let me be plain in what I mean. My first point is that as specifically and clearly seen in Broad's elaborate amplification, 'extrasensory perceptions' are not veridical perceptions at all. If not veridical, epistemologically speaking, it by necessity falls into one of the sub-categories of non-veridical perception, namely, illusions or hallucinations or delusions or "veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions". But statements involving non-veridical perception must be always assigned the truth value 'not-true'; for such statements are not true, hence of no epistemological value as far as 'knowing' is concerned. This is an overt amplification of the implicit implication of Jayatilleke's unsupported claim which asserts that statements involving 'extrasensory perception' must always be assigned the truth-value 'true'. But our above analysis very clearly shows the contradictory nature of Jayatilleke's unsupported claim. Therefore, it follows that it is not out of the question that the contradictorily opposite of Jayatilleke's unsupported claim has the valid acceptance.

6.5 My second point is that if statements involving 'extrasensory perception' must be always assigned the truth value 'not-true' ($\sim T$), its epistemological role in an empirical theory of knowledge is logically inapplicable in its context. Furthermore, sensation, electrical transmission of impulses to the brain, the environmental forces such as radiant energy in the form of light, pressure waves, etc., are logically non-present in 'extrasensory perception'. Broad's elaboration testifies to it. Alternatively Wittgensteinian 'engine idling' is the criticism which is most appropriate here. For a concept such as "on the data of extrasensory perception" is inapplicable here as the appropriate empirical background is missing.

6.5.1 Why is the background missing? Primarily because the concept lacks an empirical background. If a concept like "on the data of extrasensory perception" is taken for granted as a cardinal one in an empirical theory of knowledge, the claim needs to be established. But its application is simply without reference to the other significant concepts in the theory. In short its body and content are simply not empirical at all. Furthermore, we have shown that 'extrasensory perception' must be always assigned the truth-value 'not-true' ($\sim T$). Hence it does not play a role in an empirical theory of knowledge.

6.6 Nevertheless as there is a further possibility to interpret the said concept on the basis of 'data' or 'information' supplied by these 'extrasensory perceptions', we must now examine its philosophical significance. The alleged information by the 'extrasensory perception' is in fact gathered without the normally understood physical means where 'means' refer to the interaction of the sense-organs of the bio-chemical system and its environment. Perhaps, this does not mean that the alleged information gathered 'without means' is meaningless and necessarily false. But as far as sensation, electrical transmission of impulses to the brain, the environmental forces such as radiant energy in the form of light, pressure waves, etc. which are the sufficient necessary and constant causes of the occurrence of 'sensation' and subsequently of 'perception' are concerned, information allegedly supplied without 'these means' cannot by definition play an epistemological role in an empirical theory of knowledge; for such 'data' are not empirical at all.

6.7 But to treat 'extrasensory perception' at the same level as veridical perception is simply voiding the body and content of the concept on the one hand and employing it out of its natural context or outside the language game that is its natural home. As one must quickly come to realize this is "language goes on holiday" as Wittgenstein once remarked.³¹ In short, the concept as employed by Jayatilleke is simply meaningless as the limit of the concept is ignored. Therefore, if the concept is devoid of body and content, it does not have a role to play in a theory of knowledge. That which follows is the impossibility of interpreting the concept also on the basis of 'data' or 'information' supplied by the so-called 'extrasensory perception'. Jayatilleke's claimed 'empiricism' is therefore, a 'pseudo-empiricism' and not any type of genuine empiricism; for any type of empirical background in the sense of a bio-chemical system being successfully affected by what is normally understood as physical forces of an environment independent of it, seems absent.

6.8 Our argument up to now shows that there is no logical inquiry into the means of knowledge though Jayatilleke claims in the Preface to his book that his work contains an inquiry into the means of knowledge,³² apart from just mentioning that many of the doctrines of Buddhism are claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of 'extrasensory perception'.³³ As if to defend Jayatilleke's standpoint against a criticism made by me,³⁴ P. D. Premasiri says, "He (Jayatilleke) has raised here the question whether they are veridical or delusive, but does not answer it since he has not considered it within the scope of his work. It is clear that the scientific question as to whether they were in fact true does not fall within the scope of a discussion which is confined to the conceptual questions regarding knowledge."³⁵ This is a poor defence simply because the concepts o-

'truth' and 'knowledge' are significant ones in Philosophy as well as in science. Accordingly, Jayatilleke's failure to make an inquiry as to the means of knowledge is clearly evident. Further, Jayatilleke neither establishes these numerous claims in Buddhism nor subjects the concepts to a thorough logical inquiry. To highlight this point, the following statements which manifest his genuine aim can be quoted "We have tried to show that perception (normal and para-normal) and inductive inference are considered the means of knowledge in the Pali Nikāyas. The emphasis that 'knowing' (jñānam) must be based on 'seeing' (passam) or direct perceptive experience makes Buddhism a form of Empiricism. We have, however, to modify the use of the term somewhat to mean not only that all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience but from extrasensory experience as well. This extension we believe is justified in the reasons that we gave earlier (V. supra 735). The definition of the term in Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy also allows us to use the term 'empiricism' to include the entire conscious content of the mind, and not merely the data of the senses: 'That the sole source of knowledge is experience.....Experience may be understood as either all conscious content, data of the senses only or other designated content'".²⁶

6.9 There are several logical defects in the assertion just made by Jayatilleke. I wish to list them in the following order:

6.9.1

(i) The first logical defect is the treatment that 'seeing' (passam) is equivalent to 'direct perceptive experience'. Primarily, 'perception' which is the noun of the verb 'perceive' stands as a broad term (generic term) involving the primary activities of the five sense organs of the human bio-chemical system. They are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. What follows is very clear, namely, 'seeing' is a particular word whereas 'perception' a generic word. Therefore, any interchangeability leads to misuse of words.

(ii) Secondly, there are several uses of the concept 'direct perceptive experience' or 'direct perception'. D. M. Armstrong and J. L. Austin use the said concept in connection with their particular arguments against the 'sense-datum terminology'. For instance, Armstrong says, "Since sense-impressions do not stand between us and our immediate knowledge of the world, our theory is a Direct realism".²⁷ A similar view is expressed by Austin: "..... it is not only false but simply absurd to say that such objects as pens or cigarettes are never perceived directly".²⁸ In this connection I have expressed the following: "The proponents of 'direct perception' emphasize that the immediate objects of awareness are never anything but a physical existent, object or thing

which exists independently of the awareness of it. In other words, what is directly aware must logically exist at the time we are directly aware of it".³⁹ With reference to 'direct perception' Russell remarks in this way: "... that the whole theory as to the causes of sensation, which are partly physical and partly physiological makes it unavoidable that we should regard 'perception' as something much less direct than it seems to be".⁴⁰ But all these philosophers seem to accept the following, namely, 'perception' successfully occurs if and only if there is a bio-chemical system and the environmental forces and also that the latter affects the former. But all these conditions are non-present in the context of 'extrasensory perception' (see Broad's view above). This is clearly evidenced by Jayatilleke's following assertion too. "When the Buddha says that there arose in him the knowledge and insight that Uddaka Ramaputta had died the previous night (*nāṇaṅ ca pana dassanaṃ udapādi: abhidosa-kālakato Uddako Rāmaputto ti, M. Ī. 170*) we have to presume that this knowledge and insight was had by means of extrasensory perception ..."⁴¹ It seems as if Jayatilleke wants us to denote this sort of extrasensory perception by 'direct perceptive experience'. If so, we are perplexed. Why is it that this type of 'perception' be denoted as 'direct perceptive experience'? And, what about the type of perceptions that is spoken of by Austin, Armstrong and Russell?

(iii) Thirdly, for instance, Jayatilleke claims in his previous quotation "...not only that all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience but from extrasensory experience as well". We shall spell out his statement in this way.

(a) "All our knowledge is derived from sense experience = (P).
The contradictory of P is

(b) "Some of our knowledge is not derived from sense-experience = (~ P)

Accordingly, P and ~ P are but contradictory statements.

P	(P . ~P)	
T	T F	F
F	F F	T

Therefore, though Jayatilleke did not notice, his impressive proposal to modify the use of the term 'experience' has resulted in affirmation of a 'contradictory opposite' in one and the same statement.

(iv) Fourthly, the above defect is further highlighted once the implication of the term 'extrasensory' is worked out. For instance, if 'sensory' such experiences are denoted as 'sense-experiences' implying 'sense-perception'. And this sort of perception successfully occurs if and only if there is a bio-chemical system and environmental

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forces and furthermore if and only if the latter affects the former. If so, does not 'extrasensory' imply 'non-sensory' and therefore non-empirical? Does not Jayatilleke's further claim, namely, "that the restraint of the senses, the development of mindfulness and the elimination of the five impediments result in the possibility of attaining the first up to the fourth jhana, in which there is a perfection of equanimity and mindfulness"⁴² testify it?

Indeed Runes' definition of empiricism speaks about "the entire conscious content of the mind"; but its footing is thoroughly empirical involving basically sense-experiences. And Jayatilleke's modification logically asserts very much more. The result is ambiguity; for it stretches into wide philosophy of religion. What is evident at this juncture is an absence of clear-cut words. As "the entire conscious content of the mind" needs to be understood in the context of "a perfection of equanimity and mindfulness," in the wide philosophy of Buddhism, Jayatilleke seems to have neglected this way of looking at the issue.

Yet, his way of looking at the issue makes him posit "a ghost in the machine". What follows is elimination of genuine empiricism in favour of an impressive pseudo-empirical subject called "entire conscious content of mind". If the expression "entire conscious content of mind" is used as a name which purports to name one's mind, then, what is so named cannot but be an unidentifiable ghost in the machine—which is one's body. This metaphysical tone is further evident from the following: "Briefly, it consists in the practice of the virtuous life (*ariyena silakkhandhena samannāgato*, M. I. 346) followed by the restraint of the senses (*indriya-samvara*, loc. cit.), the development of mindfulness (*satisampajañña* - loc. cit.), and the elimination of the five impediments (*pañcanivarane pahāya*, M. I. 347). This results in the possibility of attaining the first up to the fourth jhana in which there is "a perfection of equanimity and mindfulness" (*upekkhānatipārisuddhiṃ*, loc. cit.). In this state there would be manifested the six-fold higher knowledge (*abhiñña*)."⁴³ These statements do not, however, assert an 'empiricism' but a 'pseudo-empiricism'. For "mind" is not the name of another person, working or frolicking behind an impenetrable screen; it is not the name of another place where work is done or games are played".⁴⁴

6.10 In fact, if the basis of a proposed theory of knowledge is some form of empiricism, then minding cannot be understood in logical isolation from the bio-chemical system of man. For, empiricism though understood, defined and described in multifarious ways, basically

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is the theory that sense-experience rather than reason is the one and only source of knowledge: all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience. Furthermore, empiricists usually mean by 'experience' is nothing but sense-experience. This emphasis is highlighted by Bertrand Russell's definition of empiricism, namely, "all synthetic knowledge is based on experience".⁴⁵ Here knowledge is characterized as synthetic precisely because it is not devoid of factual content; and it is not devoid of factual content precisely because it is refutable by future sense-experiences. Therefore there is no such thing as empirical knowledge which is altogether free of at least the present and future sequence of sense-experiences.

6.10.1 However, the general thesis of empiricism can receive different emphases and refinements. For example, "... empiricism has been so much determined in scope and direction by the counter-theory to which it has been opposed"⁴⁶ In this sense, Jayatilleke's purported empiricism seems opposed to rationalism and idealism; and furthermore, it attempts to enlarge what is generally accepted as empiricism in an attempt to give a significant place to the so-called extrasensory perception. Yet it is very illogical to extend one's emphasis too widely so that one's theory itself be contradictory. It is impossible reconcile a way of doing philosophy which consists in extending the use of 'empiricism' in such a way that it entails the rejection of what is ordinarily understood by 'empiricism'.

6.11 If those who practise 'pseudo-empirical' metaphysics are still empiricists they uphold a strange species of 'empiricism which has none empirical principles at its base. This is evident from whatever it is that is alleged to be referred to by the use of the expression "entire conscious content of the mind"; for, if anything is referred to by such use, it is certainly something beyond sense-experience or sense-observation. It is said that "when the mind is concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from blemishes, purged of adventitious defilments supple, pliant, steady and unperturbed, that he is said to 'turn and direct his mind to knowing and seeing' ". Surely if there is anything this statement is about, if there is any sort of 'mind' successfully referred to by the use of this sentence, then that 'mind' is logically isolated and divorced from the bio-chemical system of man: and a theory which is committed to such an isolation cannot possibly claim to be empirical in any sense, for every empirical statement is such that it is not divorced from and not free of reference to at least the present and future sequence of sense-experiences identifiable in the bio-chemical system.

6.12 Alternatively, no one can see whatever it is that is supposedly referred to by the use of the word 'mind'; no one can hear it; no one can smell it; no one can taste it; and no one can feel it. What empiricism is that?

7. Conclusion:

7.1 Epistemologically speaking, 'perceptions' in question have a definite truth value once they take the form of perceptual statements. If so, are perceptual statements (i. e., those that embody extrasensory perceptions) = 'P' in the Jayatilleke's interpretation, true? The fact is that the truth of these statements is unestablished. And Jayatilleke makes no attempt whatever to establish their truth. Even his stating the case is logically inappropriate.

NOTES

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5. K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 459
6. *Ibid.*
7. D. M. Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968, p. 226
8. *Ibid.*, p. 209
9. R. J. Hirst, *The Problems of Perception*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1959, p. 307
10. D. W. Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, p. 194
11. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, (op. cit.,) p. 459 & p. 463
12. *Ibid.*, p. 459
13. A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, Penguin, Reprint 1957, p. 19
14. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, (op. cit.,) p. 459
15. *Ibid.*, p. 459
16. J. L. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia*, Oxford Paperbacks, 1964, p. 22
17. A. J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, Macmilan & Co., 1940, p. 3
18. *Sense and Sensibilia*, (op. cit.,) p. 23
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.* pp. 23-4
21. *The Problems of Perception*, (op. cit.,) p. 42
22. J. R. Smythies, *Analysis of Perception*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1956, p. 32
23. *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, (op. cit.,) p. 21
24. *Ibid.*

25. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, (op. cit.,) p. 459
26. C. D. Broad, *Lectures on Psychological Research*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1962, pp. 190-1.
27. A. Koestler, *The Roots of Coincidence*, Hutchinson & Co., London, 2nd Impression, 1972, p. 39
28. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (op. cit.,) p. 459
29. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, p. 51e
30. D. W. Hamlyn, *The Theory of Knowledge*, Macmillan, London, 1971, p. 75
31. *Philosophical Investigations* (op. cit.,) p. 19e
32. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (op. cit.,) See Preface, p. 10
33. *Ibid.*, p. 459
34. A. D. P. Kalansuriya, *Pseudo-Empiricism*, Ceylon Studies Seminar, 1970-72 series. No. 10.
35. K. N. Jayatilleke, *Some Observations on Prof. K. N. Jayatilleke's 'Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge'*, Seminar, (P. D. Premasiri) 1974, p. 13
36. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (op. cit.,) pp. 463-4
37. D. M. Armstrong, *Perception and the Physical World*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1960, p. 193
38. *Sense and Sensibilia* (op. cit.,) p. 19
39. A. D. P. Kalansuriya, *Research Papers: Philosophy*, Lake House Printers and Publishers Ltd., Ceylon, 1972, p. 25
40. Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1959, p. 140
41. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (op. cit.,) p. 432
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42. *Ibid.*, p. 466
43. *Ibid.*
44. *The Concept of Mind* (op. cit.,) p. 50
45. Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 2nd Impression, 1951, p. 516
46. J. N. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy & Psychology*, Vol. I pp. 318-9 * *Majjhima Nikaya*